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REVIEWS
DES CONTRATS D'APREs LA RACENTE CODIFICATION PRiv n FAiTE AUX
ETATS-UNIs. By Gilbert Madray. Paris: Libraire G~n~rale de Droit et
de Jurisprudence, 1936. 8.0 310 pp.
"IN THFE history of legal institutions, the Restatement of Contracts will
constitute not only a step towards the unification of the law of the United
States but also a contribution to the international unification of law." This
sentence of the concluding paragraph of M. Madray's book points to a by-
product, and certainly not an unimportant one, of the great work undertaken
by the American Law Institute. At present, there is hardly a legal system
less known abroad than that of the United States. Spread over tens of
thousands of volumes of reports and statutes, and different in every one of
the forty-eight states, it is a secret science even to the majority of the grow-
ing number of European scholars of comparative law. For the first time, the
Restatement will render the law of the United States available to foreign
lawyers who are eagerly waiting for an access to this vast body of law of
a country where creative activity in the law is probably greater today than in
any other part of the world.
To American readers, Professor Madray's book will prove that the unrest
pervading American law is not restricted to this country, and will demon-
strate the eagerness of Europeans to utilize world-wide experiences and ideas
for the solution of world-wide problems. It will also indicate to them how
American law appears to a foreigner who derives his knowledge thereof
almost exclusively from the Restatement. And they will probably be less
astonished to see that in some respects the picture is almost comically dis-
torted than to find that it is mostly quite correct and accurate. M. Madray's
book bears testimony to the skill of the restaters.
The first two hundred pages survey those topics of the Restatement which
appear to the author to be remarkable either because of their intrinsic im-
portance or because of their bearing on current discussions in France. In a
good many places he praises the solutions of the Restatement as superior to
those of the law of France. While in French law assignment of debts, for
instance, is treated under the head of sales, American law treats it, like
German law, as a transaction sui gccris3, Obviously, the treatment of an
assignment made as a gift is facilitated by such an approach. Under the pro-
visions of the Code Napoleon, now more than one hundred and thirty years
old, third party beneficiary contracts are a constant source of trouble to
French lawyers. The author finds that the provisions of the Restatement sat-
isfy present-day needs more adequately. Voidability of a contract because of
undue influence is unknown as such in French law and can be achieved by
other devices only in rare instances; it is praised by M. Madray as an insti-
tution tending to promote a desirable convergence of law and ethics. The
French Code does not contain any provision determining the moment when
1. RESTATEMENT, ComNaAcrs (1932) c. 7.
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a contract becomes binding, and the courts did not succeed in establishing a
generally accepted solution of this important problem. Until recently, the
Court of Cassation declared the determination of this moment to be a ques-
tion of fact, left to the sovereign discretion of the trial courts. In 1932, that
Court finally declared itself in favor of the so-called "system of expedition,"
according to which a contract becomes binding when the acceptance is ex-
pedited by the offeree.2 M. Madray rejoices in finding the same solution in
the Restatement, and leads the attention of French lawyers to the elaborate
provisions concerning questions of detail.
Yet his treatment of this last problem reveals that M. Madray has not
always penetrated through surface appearances. He writes: "The advantages
presented by such a solution [i.e., by the "system of expedition"] are in-
contestable: it allows a gain of time in the conclusion of bargains, and it
avoids the difficulty of evidence which presents itself when it must be proved,
under the 'system of information,' that the offeror has obtained actual knowl-
edge of the acceptance." The author overlooks the fact that this difficulty
is avoided likewise in the "system of reception," which was adopted by the
German Code and under which the bargain is struck as soon as the accept-
ance has come into the hands of the offeror so that he can obtain actual
knowledge thereof. This latter system avoids the difficulties which arise under
the system of expedition when the letter of acceptance is lost in the mail
or does not reach the offeror within the period indicated by him. In a recent
article Professor Nussbaum has suggested that the theory of expedition has
its proper place in the common law where, because an offer is not binding,
the acceptor's interests require that the binding force of the contract takes
place at the earliest possible moment. It is not required, however, in a legal
system which has no difficulties in depriving an offeror of the power of
revoking at any moment -his offer." M. Madray himself points out quite
properly how much easier it is to treat an offer as binding in French law
than under the Restatement.
There are other points where he believes that American law could profit
from studying French law, e.g., in its treatment of contracts concluded with
oneself,4 its detailed case law with respect to contractual clauses limiting or
excluding the liability of carriers, utilities, arid other persons. He overlooks,
however, the elaborate American rules on this problem, which, it is true,
are not to be found in the Restatement of Contracts. M. Madray's belief
that the French system of a.streintes is capable of wider application and
greater flexibility than the American remedy of specific performance seems,
likewise, to be based on the erroneous notion that the chancellor's decrees
are enforced specifically and directly, and not, as the French astreintes, in-
directly through the threat of punishment. If M. Madray were familiar with
the German Code of Civil Procedure, he would find that the maximum scope
2. Decision of March 21, 1932, D. 1933. 1. 65.
3. Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance
Doctrine (1936) 36 CoL L. REV. 920.
4. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS (1932) § 15. Comment (a').
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of applicability and flexibility of specific performance is achieved when the
methods of direct and indirect enforcement are combined.
5
In spite of such and similar misunderstandings, M. Madray's work con-
tains enough suggestions to render it worth while reading to Americans,
especially its second part, entitled "The Spirit of the Restatement," where
the author deals with three problems of acute present interest to French
lawyers: the relation between intention and declaration of a contracting party;
the relation between law and ethics; and the role of the judge.
Bent on discovering general truths and principles, the German Pandectists
of the 19th century and their predecessors, the natural law scholars, asked
what created the binding force of a contract, the "intentions" of the con-
tracting parties, or their "declarations." Taking up this controversy, the
restaters of the American law of contracts declare themselves emphatically
in favor of the latter view. Our author demonstrates that they vere not able
to carry out this so-called "objective" theory consistently, and that under
the Restatement rules the courts are ordered to regard the actual intentions
of the parties in so many crucial points that in reality the restaters' system
appears to be based on the "subjective" theory, which is regarded as the only
true one in prevailing French doctrine. M. Madray states a whole list of
sections of the Restatement where one role or another is ascribed to the
"intention" of the parties, e.g., in the determination of whether or not an
act of execution constitutes an acceptance of an offer to a unilateral contract,
or whether or not an offer is accepted by mere silence, or whether a scroll
or other mark constitutes a seal, or whether a certain conduct is an offer or
a mere proposition. He calls attention to Section 504, according to which
the true intention of the parties is the aim sought in rectification of a contract,
and he sees the "triumph of the internal will over the declared intention" in
Section 507, Comment (a), where it is stated that a court may order a con-
tract to be performed in accordance with the real Al of the parties, as if it
were rectified, even without a preceding decree of rectification. He finds an
expression of the subjective theory, also, in Section 526, Comment (b),
where a contract is declared to be illegal because of usury when the parties
have hidden behind the subterfuge of "costs" or "commission" the excessive
rate of interest on which they have really agreed.
However, this and other instances of "simulated" agreements have little
to do with the problem of the relation between intention and declaration.
5. There are a good many other points where U. Madray's judgment is influenced
by his lack of familiarity with the background of the Restatement of Contracts, as, for
example, his critique of the American terminology with respect to the distinction
between damages for corporeal and non-corporeal harm. He takes it for granted that
this distinction corresponds to the French distinction between dommage mal,&fel and
dommage moral, which is due to the fact that in French law, as a general principle,
compensation is granted only for such consequences of a wrongful act as affect the
plaintiff's assets in money or money's value, while damages for pain and suffering appear
as an exception. There is no doubt whatever in American law that the victim of a
wrongful act is entitled to damages for pain and suffering where such pain and suffer-
ing are caused by a bodily impact Difficulties do not arise except where mental pain
and suffering are caused, without a bodily impact.
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The parties have simply made two different declarations, and the real in-
tentions of the parties come into play only insofar as that declaration prevails
which is conformable to the intention of the parties, while the law discards
the other declaration which is meant to be no more than a pretext for the
deception of third parties or of the authorities of the state. But even beyond
such doubts, in reading M. Madray's discussion one cannot avoid feeling that
both the restaters and their critic overestimate the importance of the con-
troversy between the objective and the subjective theory. The binding force
of a contract is, of course, "created" neither by the "intention" of the parties
nor by their "declarations," but by the legal order. The legal order alone-
this expression can, of course, be further analysed as meaning the complex
phenomenon of the wills of those individuals who establish and enforce the
so-called rules of law-"creates" legal relations. It orders that under certain
circumstances certain individuals shall have certain rights and duties. In
our type of civilization one of the most important circumstances assumed by
the legal order as an occasion for creating rights and duties is the will of the
individuals immediately concerned. Within limits, the law disposes that in-
dividuals shall be bound by such duties as they voluntarily undertake to be
bound by, and that other individuals shall have corresponding "rights." Thus
the "intention" of the parties undoubtedly appears as the immediate source
of all those rights and duties which "arise" from "contracts" and other
voluntary transactions. Intentions are unknowable, however, unless they are
declared, and words as well as any other symbols are imperfect means of
conveying meanings. On its face, no .declaration is absolutely unambiguous,
and nobody hearing another's declaration can ever be certain whether he
has really understood the meaning "meant" by the declarant. This phenom-
enon confronts the legal order with the problem of determining which one of
several possible meanings of a declaration shall prevail, the meaning meant
by the declarant, or the meaning understood by the declaree, or some other
meaning, perhaps the meaning understood by certain third persons, judges,
for instance, or members of a jury. This problem cannot be solved by any
method of scientific discovery, but can be answered only by considerations
of policy and expediency. And it is answered differently in different legal
systems. While French law is inclined to protect the expectations of a
declarant, English and American law tend more towards protecting the ex-
pectations of the declaree, and German law attempts to find a compromise.0
These differences of policy may be expressed by the antithesis between ob-
jective and subjective theory. But those terms become dangerously mislead-
ing, when they are taken as expressions of general truths or principles instead
of guiding maxims of legal policy.
In his chapter on "Contract and Ethics," M. Madray touches on a problem
of fundamental importance in the evolution of law in general. Always and
everywhere the law necessarily tends to express and enforce the prevailing
ethical ideals of the time and place. By their very nature, as rules of con-
science, however, ethical rules must be infinitely flexible, while rules of law
6. See this reviewer's statement in 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1937)
§1600e.
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must have at least a minimum amount of generality, certainty, and predict-
ability. Every law of the world is a compromise between the conflicting
ideals of stability and flexibility, and legal history may be looked upon as
a history of fluctuations towards one or the other pole. There are periods
when the ideal of ethical flexibility prevails and others where the law tends
to become rigid and inflexible. Max Weber has shown that the capitalistic
system needs for its existence a law of great stability, certainty, and predict-
ability. It is based on long-range calculations and investment, and the
willingness to invest is increased by the existence of a legal system where
debts and other contracts are promptly and rigidly enforced. Our own times
witness a world-wide reaction against the capitalistic spirit; it finds expres-
sion in such radical movements as communism or national-socialism, but also
in the "legal romanticism"7 of countries like France which have not re-
pudiated the capitalistic system as such. In the United States, farmers and
other small middle-class elements have always mitigated the influence of big
business and influenced legal developments in the interests of debtors. No
wonder, therefore, that M. Madray finds in American law a good many
expressions of those tendencies which, resulting in mitigating the rigor of
the formal law and in producing a greater convergence of legal rules and
ethical commands, have also found increasing weight and attention in post-
war developments of France. Without being aware of the deeper connections
and problems involved, he states these similarities as an encouragement to his
French colleagues to proceed on those paths of legal idealism.
Any attempt to give legal expression to ethical ideals must necessarily
result in rules of law expressed in elastic, flexible terms. To a considerable
extent, clear-cut formulations of narrow legal rules must yield to expressions
of standards the application of which leaves much room to the creative
activity of the law-enforcing agencies. This necessary connection is over-
looked by M. Madray. Though fervently approving of the increasing influence
on the law of the "rtgle morale," he disapproves of recent developments in
French law granting to the courts certain powers to adapt contractual rela-
tions to changing economic conditions. When he finds in the Restatement
such an indefinite concept as that of "impossibility in a business sense," he
holds it before his French colleagues as a warning example of the horrible
consequences to which such tendencies might lead. Never should French
lawyers give up the dear-cut formulations of their Code for such indefinite
expressions as "reasonable," "material," "honestly," of which the Restate-
ment abounds and which give such a dangerously wide play to judicial arbi-
trariness. In dealing with American law, M. Madray is apparently unaware
of the existence of the jury, which could not fulfill its very purpose of keeping
the law in accordance with popular ethical ideals if the law, instead of using
"indefinite" standards, were expressed throughout in narrow rules and for-
mulas. In dealing with his own law, his dislike for attempts to protect debtors
against the disastrous consequences of the economic crises of the War and
the depression causes him to overlook the wide field of discretion left to the
7. Term invented by Professor Julien Bonnecase in LA PmlstE 3umiQuE m-A&NWs
DEpUIs 1804 A r'n'Um PRSErm (1933).
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courts by a good many of the provisions of the Code Napoleon, for example,
in the field of torts, by articles 1382, 1383 of the Code Napoleon. Even in
the field of contracts, French law places broad discretionary powers in the
hands of the courts. The determination of so fundamental a question, for
instance, as whether one party's breach of contract is so material as to entitle
the other party to withdraw from the contract, is entirely left to the discretion
of the trial courts, which find no guidance whatever in the provisions of the
Code s and very little in the case law of the Court of Cassation. The trial
courts are entirely free in granting or denying a term of grace to a defaulting
debtor, or in distinguishing the proximate from the remote consequences of
a breach of contract.9 Neither in America, nor in England, Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, or Italy are trial courts so free from control by their supreme
courts as they are in France. It is true, the French ordinary courts 0 have
resisted attempts to enlarge the concept of "impossibility of performance"
for the purpose of granting relief to promisors whose duties have become
more burdensome as a result of unforeseen changes in the economic situation
of the country, but French law is more lenient than others to defaulting
debtors in general, and can protect them quite efficiently by other means. In
no event, however, does this phenomenon justify the assertion that the rules




CASES AN) MATERIALS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Ernest G. Lorenzen.
Fourth Edition. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1937. Pp. xxxvi, 1138.
$6.00.
THIs, in a word, is the most comprehensive and exhaustive collection of
cases and related materials describing the doctrines as to the conflicts of
laws, as applied in the courts of the United States, which has thus far ap-
peared. It is, one might add, not a work to be produced uno ictu, but rather
the last epitome of the cumulative study and experience of one who has long
been recognized as an authority in this complex and increasingly significant
phase of law. It succeeds three earlier editions of 1909, 1924, and 1932,
each of which had an enviable success. It follows no less than three com-
peting and meritorious casebooks which have appeared during the past three
years. Like them, it reflects the increasing volume of decisions, law-review
notes, articles, and treatises dealing with the varied problems of conflicts of
laws by which the legal literature of this country has been recently enriched.
To take adequate account of these developments has required, as the author
intimates in the preface, a thorough-going revision, which substantially ad-
8. Art. 1184.
9. Art. 1151.
10. The French administrative courts are steering a different course.
t Max Pam Associate Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago.
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